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RIGHT TO COUNSEL
of the nature and cause of the accusation,' who must be
'confronted with the witnesses against him,'" and who must be
accorded 'compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor.' 41 "The right to defend is given directly to the accused;
for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails." 42
SUPREME COURT
KINGS COUNTY
People v. Isaacs43
(printed August 1, 1994)
Defendant claimed that under the New York State
Constitution 44 his right to counsel attached while he awaited
arraignment on older charges that were unrelated to the present
charge of murder in the second degree.45 The defendant asserted
that his right to counsel could not be waived once it attached,
thus any subsequent inculpatory statements elicited from him by
the police should have been suppressed.46 Supreme Court, Kings
County held that the right to counsel did not attach prior to
arraignment while the defendant was in police custody.47 The
court found that there had been no significant judicial activity
which would have triggered defendant's right to counsel, and that
as such, the incriminating statements made by defendant to police
should not have been suppressed. 48
41. Id. at 819.
42. Id. at 819-20.
43. N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 1994, at 25 (Sup. CL Kings County 1994).
44. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (McKinney 1987). Section 6 provides in
pertinent part: "In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel... ." Id.
45. Isaacs, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 1994, at 25.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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On July 30, 1992, the defendant was identified as a suspect of a
homicide, which had occurred the previous day. 4 9 The witness
had picked the defendant out of a group of six photos shown to
him by police.5 0
On August 28, 1992, the detectives investigating the murder
learned that the defendant was in police custody, awaiting
arraignment on an unrelated charge in criminal court. 51 Prior to
the arraignment, the detectives took the defendant for
interrogation and advised him of his Miranda rights.52 The
defendant waived his rights and subsequently gave the police an
unsigned, inculpatory, written statement.53 Shortly thereafter, the
defendant requested an attorney and the interrogation ceased. 54
The defendant claimed that his right to counsel could not have
been waived, since this right automatically attached while he
awaited arraignment on the older charge. 55 Thus, the defendant
argued, any statements made without the benefit of counsel must
be suppressed. 56
The defendant further contended that there was a purposeful
and unnecessary delay in his arraignment, specifically
orchestrated so the police could obtain his confession without his
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the
Supreme Court held that any inculpatory or exculpatory statements obtained
from a defendant, during a custodial interrogation, without the defendant
having been given full warning of his constitutional rights, are inadmissible as
having been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. at 444.
53. Isaacs, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 1994, at 25.
54. Id. Following the interrogation, the police conducted a line-up in
which the defendant was again identified as the subject seen leaving the scene
of the Brooklyn homicide. Id. This line up identification was made by the same
witness who had made the previous photo array identification leading to the
arrest in question. Id. Later that same day, the defendant was again identified
by a second witness from a photo array. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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RJGHT TO COUNSEL
attorney being present.57 Therefore, the defendant claimed, this
delay should have automatically triggered his right to counsel. 58
The court, in analyzing the defendant's contentions, had to
determine at what point in the arrest process the right to counsel
attached. 59 In People v. Rogers,60 the New York Court of
Appeals acknowledged that a defendant must be protected against
the "awesome and sometimes coercive force of the State." 61
Further, the court found that the notification by, or presence of,
an attorney "serves to equalize the positions of the accused and
sovereign, mitigating the coercive influence of the State and
rendering it less overwhelming." 62 The Rogers court then
concluded that "once an attorney has entered the
proceeding... a defendant, in custody, may not be further
interrogated in the absence of counsel." 63 Thus, after notice has
been given by counsel to cease interrogation, any inculpatory
statements elicited from the defendant, without the presence of
counsel, must be suppressed. 64
The defendant's right to counsel may also attach,
automatically, at some point prior to actual notice being given by
an attorney. In People v. Samuels,65 it was acknowledged that
57. Id.
58. Id. The defendant also contended that both the line up and the photo
array used in his identification were unduly suggestive, and should be
suppressed. Id.
59. Id.
60. 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979). The
defendant in Rogers, a youth of limited education, was held in police
interrogative custody for six hours in connection with the robbery of a liquor
store. Id. at 174, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22. The defendant had
given the police an inculpatory statement on an unrelated matter, following
notification by defendant's attorney instructing the police to cease
interrogation. Id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
61. Id. at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 169, 397 N.E.2d at 710-11, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
64. Id. at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
65. 49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1980). The
defendant was arrested on a warrant charging him with robbery. Id. at 220,
400 N.E.2d at 1345, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 893. Prior to his arraignment, the
107319951
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defendant's right to counsel attaches at the commencement of a
criminal action 66 or at any critical stage of a criminal
prosecution, and may also attach when there has been
"significant judicial activity." 67 In Samuels, the filing of a felony
complaint to obtain an arrest warrant was considered by the court
to be a significant judicial activity in which the right to counsel
attached. 68 Thus, those statements obtained from the defendant in
Samuels, subsequent to the filing of the criminal complaint,
absent counsel, must be suppressed. 69 The New York Court of
Appeals has further acknowledged that the filing of an
indictment, prior to arraignment, constitutes significant judicial
activity in which a defendant's right to counsel attaches. 70
The Isaacs court felt that there had not been any judicial
activity in the present case, as defined in Samuels or Settles.7 1
Only routine booking procedures were initiated against Isaacs in
both sets of charges. 72 There had been neither an indictment, the
defendant was questioned without the presence of counsel and gave both oral
and written statements implicating himself in the robbery. Id.
66. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 1.20(17) (McKinney 1992). Section
1.20(17) states in pertinent part: "A criminal action is commenced by the filing
of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court. . . ." Id.
67. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d at 221, 400 N.E.2d at 1345-46, 424 N.Y.S.2d at
894. See People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819, 401 N.Y.S.2d
57 (1977) (holding a police line-ip is a critical stage in which the defendant's
right to counsel may be attached).
68. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d at 221, 400 N.E.2d at 1345-46, 424 N.Y.S.2d at
894.
69. Id.
70. See People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d
874 (1978). In Settles, the court stated that a "filing of an indictment
constitutes the commencement of formal judicial action against the defendant
and is equated with the entry of an attorney into the proceeding." Id. at 159,
385 N.E.2d at 613-14, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 876. The court then further stated that
"a defendant in a postindictment, prearraignment custodial setting, even though
not then represented by an attorney, may not in the absence of counsel waive
his right to... counsel." Id.; see also People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279,
183 N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962) (holding that there need be no
formal request for counsel following an arraignment or an indictment as such
right attaches concurrently with such judicial action).
71. Isaacs, N.Y. L.J., August 1, 1995, at 25.
72- Id.
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filing of an accusatory instrument, 73 nor the issuance of a
warrant, all of which would have triggered the defendant's right
to counsel.74
The court in Isaacs was then left to determine if the
defendant's right to counsel attached when the defendant was in
police custody awaiting arraignment for an unrelated charge. The
New York Court of Appeals in People v. Wilson,75 determined
that since no accusatory instrument had been prepared or signed,
there was no commencement of any criminal action.76 Thus, the
Wilson court rejected the defendant's argument that his right to
counsel attached simply because he was physically in police
custody as he awaited arraignment. 77 In accordance with the
Wilson decision, the Isaacs court held that the right to an attorney
does not attach where "[o]nly routine booking procedures
73. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 1.20(1) (McKinley 1992). Section 1.20(1)
states in pertinent part: "Accusatory instrument" means an indictment, an
information, a simplified information, a prosecutor's information, a superior
court information, a misdemeanor complaint or a felony.complaint." Id.
74. Isaacs, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 1994, at 25.
75. 56 N.Y.2d 692, 436 N.E.2d 1321, 451 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1982). Wilson
had been booked and processed at the New York Criminal Courts building. Id.
at 693, 436 N.E.2d at 1321, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 719. Police officers had arrived
at the court to sign a complaint against Wilson. Id. Prior to the completion of
the paperwork, Wilson waived his rights and made inculpatory statements to
the officers. Id. at 693, 436 N.E.2d at 1322, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 719. Wilson
then sought to have those statements suppressed. Id.
76. Id. at 693-94, 436 N.E.2d at 1322, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
77. Id. at 694, 436 N.E.2d at 1322, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 720. See People v.
Smiley, 100 A.D.2d 294, 475 N.Y.S.2d 533 (3d Dep't 1984) (holding that
unless the accused has requested counsel or there has been some significant
judicial activity, the right to counsel does not indelibly attach at the completion
of the investigatory stage nor the subsequent processing stage of the arrest);
People v. Cooper, 101 A.D.2d 1, 475 N.Y.S.2d 660 (4th Dep't 1984). Cooper
held that there is a constitutional right to counsel when a matter has passed
from the investigatory to the prosecutorial stage and a criminal proceeding has
commenced. Id. at 7, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 665. Such representation is necessaryinasmuch as the defendant now "finds himself faced with the prosecutorial
forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and
procedural criminal law." Id.
1995] 1075
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incidental to a warrantless arrest, which did not involve judicial
action, had occurred." '78
The court then examined defendant's claim that his
constitutional right to counsel was triggered by the purposeful
and unnecessary delay in his arraignment. 79 The New York State
Criminal Procedure Law demands expediency whenever a person
has been arrested without a warrant. 80 Any lack of expediency,
in filing an accusatory instrument, is prima faie evidence of a
suspicious circumstance, which may be deemed to be an
unreasonable delay. 8 1 However, the New York Court of Appeals
in People v. Hopkins,82 established that a delay in arraignment is
merely one of various factors to consider when evaluating
whether or not an automatic right to counsel exists. 83 Where
78. Isaacs, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 1994, at 25. The court continued beyond
the facts of Isaacs, by discussing the accused's right to counsel during
questioning on matters unrelated to the defendant's arrest on a warrant. Id.
The court noted that "[a] pending unrelated criminal case upon which an arrest
warrant has issued does not bar the police from questioning a subject when the
suspect does not in fact have counsel on the unrelated charge." Id.
79. Id.
80. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 140.20(1) (McKinney 1992). Section
140.20(1) states in pertinent part:
Upon arresting a person without a warrant, a police officer, after
performing without unnecessary delay all recording.., and other
preliminary police duties ... must... without unnecessary delay bring
the arrested person ... before a local criminal court and file therewith
an appropriate accusatory instrument charging him with the
offense ... in question.
Id.
81. Isaacs, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 1995, at 25. See People ex. rel Maxian v.
Brown, 77 N.Y.2d 422, 570 N.E.2d 223, 568 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1991). The
Brown court concluded that the prearraignment process should generally be
completed within twenty four hours, unless there is a reasonable explanation
for the delay. Id. at 427, 570 N.E.2d at 225, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
82. 58 N.Y.2d 1079, 449 N.E.2d 419, 462 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1983). The
court found that the unexpected discovery of evidence linking Hopkins to two
unsolved murders was "more than sufficient justification for postponing the
originally scheduled arraignment." Id. at 1081, 449 N.E.2d at 420, 462
N.Y.S.2d at 640. The court frther stated that "such a delay does not cause the
right to counsel to attach automatically." Id.
83. Id. at 1081, 449 N.E.2d at 420, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
1076 [Vol111
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 11 [2020], No. 3, Art. 58
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/58
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
sufficient justification exists to cause a delay of arraignment, the
defendant is precluded from invoking his constitutional right to
counsel to attach automatically. 84
The court in Isaacs observed that the defendant had presented
no evidence showing any such unreasonable or suspicious
delay. 85 The court noted that the defendant failed to present any
evidence that indicated how much time had lapsed between the
first arrest and his initial arraignment. 86 As such, the court
denied the motion to suppress the defendant's inculpatory
statements. 87
The New York courts have extended right to counsel
protections beyond that of the federal government under the
United States Constitution.88 In Patterson v. Illinois,89 the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the existence of a
defendant's right to counsel upon indictment need not preclude
84. Id. See People v. Holland, 48 N.Y.2d 861, 863, 400 N.E.2d 293, 294,
424 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (1979) (holding that lengthy delay in arraignment,
coupled with multiple "periods of prolonged and vigorous interrogation"
should lead to suppression of statements made by defendant as they are not
made voluntarily).
85. Isaacs, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 1994, at 25.
86. Id.
87. Id. The Isaacs court then addressed defendant's claims of undue
suggestiveness in the identification process used by the police during their
investigation. Id. The court subsequently held the defendant had "failed... to
establish suggestiveness so as to suppress the line up identification[,]" and "the
photo array and the line up was more in the nature of a confirmation rather
than an identification...." Id.
88. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution states in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial... and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
89. 487 U.S. 285 (1988). Following his indictment for murder, and the
subsequent voluntary waiving of his Miranda rights, Patterson gave statements
to the police, without the benefit of counsel, indicating his complicity in the
murder. Id. at 288. Patterson later sought to have the statements held
inadmissible claiming that, although he repeatedly refused to have counsel
present, the police were barred from questioning him since his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached automatically with his indictment. Id. at
290.
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the police from further interrogation, if the defendant has waived
his rights following sufficient Miranda warnings. 90
In conclusion, the New York cases analyzed in Isaacs show an
expansion of federal rights afforded to defendants in the post
indictment phase of prosecution. Specifically, New York
provides greater protection than that provided under the Federal
Constitution in the sense that according to New York
constitutional law, the indelible attachment of right to counsel in
post-indictment and post-arraignment settings, the defendant may
not, in the absence of representation, waive his right to have
counsel present during subsequent phases of the prosecution.
90. Id.
1078 [Vol 11
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